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Abstract
Common ownership - where two firms are at least partially owned by the same investor - and its impact
on product market outcomes has recently drawn a lot of attention from scholars and practitioners alike.
Theoretical and empirical research suggests that common ownership can lead to higher prices. This
paper focuses on implications for market entry. To estimate the effect of common ownership on entry
decisions, we focus on the pharmaceutical industry. In particular, we consider the entry decisions of
generic pharmaceutical firms into drug markets opened up by the end of regulatory protection in the US.
We first provide a theoretical framework that shows that a higher level of common ownership between
the brand firm (incumbent) and potential generic entrant reduces the generic’s incentives to entry. We
provide robust evidence for this prediction. The effect is large: a one-standard-deviation increase in
common ownership decreases the probability of generic entry by 9-13%. We extend our basic theoretical
framework and allow for multiple entrants. Our model shows that for sufficiently high levels of common
ownership, the classical idea of entry decisions being strategic substitutes can be reversed into being
strategic complements. Our empirical results provide some support for these predictions.
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1 Introduction
BlackRock and Vanguard, the world’s largest institutional investors, are the top two
shareholders in Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Abbott Laboratories, Perrigo, and Allergan,
which are clearly competitors in the US pharmaceutical markets (Thomson Reuters
Global Ownership Database, 2015).1 Investors’ holdings in multiple firms gives rise
to “common ownership.” Unlike undiversified investors, who have a large stake in one
firm in an industry, common investors have an incentive to exert influence on several
firms with an industry-wide perspective.2 Thus firms’ connectivity through investor
shareholdings may alter their strategic decisions.
The focus of this paper is on the effect of common ownership on one of the most
important strategic decisions firms make: entry. Specifically, we analyse generic firms’
entry decisions into pharmaceutical markets opened up by the end of regulatory pro-
tection. Patent-protected markets are a vital source of revenue for brand firms. With
the event of generic entry, revenues to the brand firms can decline by as much as 90%
(Bransetter et al., 2016). Moreover, losses to the brand and gains to the generic are
highly asymmetric. According to one estimate, brand firms value deterring entry, on
average, at about $4.6 billion. In contrast, generic firms value the right to enter at
about $236.8 million (Jacobo-Rubio et al., 2017). Thus, generic firms’ entry decisions
may crucially depend on whether investors in a potential generic entrant also have an
interest in the brand (incumbent).
We show that a higher level of common ownership between a brand firm and a po-
tential generic entrant is robustly linked with a lower probability of generic entry. To
do so we combine patent and drug approval data from the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration’s (FDA) Orange Book with ownership data of publicly listed pharmaceutical
companies from the Thomson Reuters Global Ownership Database. The US pharma-
ceutical industry is an attractive industry to consider in this to focus on: (i) there
are large payoffs to the incumbent (brand) firm if (generic) entry can be delayed or
deterred, (ii) the pharmaceutical industry is characterised by a wide range of levels of
common ownership, (iii) there are many potential (generic) entrants, (iv) pharmaceut-
ical markets are well defined, (v) one can identify clear entry windows, and (vi) the US
health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP is among the highest in the world.
In this paper we first present a simple theoretical framework to understand the ef-
fects of common ownership between an incumbent and a potential entrant. Thereafter
1Institutional investors such as Blackrock and Vanguard manage other people’s money by buying
and controlling equity in companies.
2See Azar, Schmalz and Tecu (2016) for a review of the available evidence.
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we empirically test and corroborate the proposition that higher common ownership
between a brand and a generic firm reduces the incentives to enter of the generic firm.
This result is robust to a wide range of measures of common ownership, different econo-
metric specifications, different definitions of the set of potential entrants and different
time-horizons of the decision-making process. Our regressions include the controls
used in previous literature including pre-entry brand sales, on-patent molecular substi-
tutes, entrant experience and the presence of authorised generic. The effect is large: a
one-standard-deviation increase common ownership decreases the probability of generic
entry by 9-13%. Our results are even stronger if we instrument the common ownership
measures with stock market index membership or company headquarters location. Still,
the effect of a generic firm’s common ownership with the brand firm is smaller than the
effect of being a subsidiary of the brand company.
We extend the basic framework to take into account that several generic firms may be
simultaneously deciding whether to enter the market of the same brand firm. We show
that the classical result of entry decisions being strategic substitutes may be reversed
in the presence of common ownership. Entry decisions become strategic complements
-i.e. a focal generic firm’s entry is less likely when another generic’s probability of entry
decreases- when the degree of common ownership is high. As a result, for low levels
of common ownership, entry decisions are strategic substitutes but, when the levels of
common ownership are large, entry decisions are strategic complements. Our empirical
results provide some support for these predictions.
Common ownership linkages created by institutional investors is a pervasive feature
not only of pharmaceutical companies, but of many industries in the US as well as
in Europe (Fichtner and Garcia-Bernardo, 2017). While large institutional investors
may own 5-8% of a single company, this is normally enough to position them as a top
investor with privileged access to the firms’ management (Malenko and Shen, 2016).
Furthermore, and contrary to others, institutional investors are also less willing - or
are more restricted - to divest their positions in poorly performing stocks since they
follow an index. Therefore, they might be more motivated than other investors to be
engaged owners (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998). Managers, in turn, might be more inclined
to listen as well, as institutional investors’ stakes are sizeable and tend to exhibit lower
turnover rates (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).3 There is indeed growing academic
evidence that large institutional investors engage in active discussions with companies’
board and management with a view to influence the companies’ long-term strategies
3While other institutional investors, such as hedge funds, are able to exert influence through exit,
these investors are much less diversified and hence less likely to possess stakes in several companies in
the same industry, see Banal-Estanol et al. (2018).
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(e.g., McCahery, 2016; Fichtner and Garcia-Bernardo, 2017).4
The ongoing concentration of ownership in the hands of a few large investors and
the corresponding escalation in common ownership is unprecedented. It is the defining
feature of the firm ownership structures in the present-day. Dubbed “an economic
blockbuster” and “the major new antitrust challenge of our time”, common ownership
is undoubtedly an important, new topic in economics (Elhauge, 2016; Posner et al.,
2017). The issue has received significant media attention and instigated public debate;
see e.g. The Economist (2015), The New York Times (2016), Handelsblatt Global
(2016) and OECD (2017).
Empirical research on the topic is still in its infancy. For a large sample of US pub-
lic firms, He and Huang (2017) find that common ownership by institutional investors
facilitates explicit forms of product market coordination which in turn improves innov-
ation productivity and operating profitability. Azar et al. (2017), on the other hand,
provide the first empirical evidence consistent with common shareholders being able to
increase prices in the airline industry. The results of these studies have been subject
to ongoing debate. Certain scholars and investment industry insiders maintain that
large institutional investors do not have material influence on market outcomes and
that there is no robust causal link between common ownership and firms’ strategies
(O’Brien and Waehrer, 2017). There is, however, a resounding agreement that more
research is required to understand the strategic benefits and profit implications of com-
mon ownership (O’Brien and Waehrer, 2017; Patel, 2017; OECD, 2017).
This paper is the first to directly consider the influence of common ownership on
market entry. Whereas pricing decisions are typically made on a regular basis by spe-
cialised pricing teams, market entry is a once-off decision with substantial consequences
for the firm. Hence, and consistent with the results of the paper, we expect signific-
ant shareholder involvement in those decisions, and thus a pervasive effect of common
ownership. Simultaneous research by Xie and Gerakos (2018) consider how ownership
linkages through institutional shareholdings affect patent settlements between brand
and generic firms. Hence, their study is complementary to this paper. They find that
institutional cross-holdings between a brand and generic are significantly positively as-
sociated with the likelihood that the two parties will enter into a settlement agreement
in which the brand pays the generic to stay out of the market.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a literature overview
of entry in pharmaceutical markets and common ownership. Section 3 introduces the
basic theoretical framework. Section 4 presents data and variable construction. Section
4We show in an Appendix that investors confirm this view, both in general and for pharma markets.
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5 describes the empirical implementation. Section 6 presents and discusses the results.
Section 7 extends the framework to multiple entrants. Section 9 concludes. We fur-
ther include Appendices on data construction, anecdotal evidence on how institutional
investors influence firms’ decisions and empirical robustness checks.
2 Literature
2.1 Entry in pharma
Several papers have considered the determinants of generic entry decisions in off-patent
drug markets, i.e., markets where the patent of the brand company has expired. A
common finding from this literature is that generic entry increases with the size of the
branded drugs market prior to the loss of patent protection, where ‘size’ is measured as
brand-generated revenues (Scott Morton, 1999, 2000; Hudson, 2000; Saha et al., 2006;
Moreno-Torres et al., 2008; Appelt, 2015).
Scott Morton (1999) further considers other aspects of generic entry decisions in
US pharma markets in-depth and finds that generic firms are more likely to enter
markets in which they have previous experience e.g. in drug form, therapy class or
ingredient. Kyle (2006) and Appelt (2015) similarly confirm the importance of generic
firm characteristics. Scott Morton (2000) examines the effect of pre-patent expiration
brand advertising expenditures on the number of generic entrants in the US, and finds
no evidence that brand advertising impacts generic entry. Scott Morton (1999, 2000)
also finds that drugs that treat chronic conditions attract more generic entry and that
generic entry is influenced by drug form; generic entry of oral solids tends to be more
extensive than that of injectables. Appelt (2015) considers the impact of authorised
generics, i.e., the distribution and marketing of the brand product under a generic label
through a subsidiary or authorised generic distributor (typically just before the loss of
the patent). Using a sample of 73 off-patent drug markets between the years 2002 and
2007 in Germany, she finds that authorised generic entry has no significant effect on the
likelihood of generic entry. Other studies have considered the effect of a brand’s stock of
goodwill and the duration that a brand is on the market without generic competition,
with opposing results (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988; Hudson, 2000, Appelt, 2015).
Most relevant for this study, is one previous paper that considers how the relation-
ship between the brand firm and generic firm may influence the likelihood of generic
entry. Scott Morton (2002) considers the entry decisions of generic subsidiaries of brand
companies. She finds that after controlling for the experience of the generic, generics
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owned by the original innovator (i.e., the brand company) are less likely to enter the
market. The interpretation of this result is that once the generic has taken efficiencies
related its own previous experience in the drug form, therapy and ingredients into ac-
count, the generic avoids competing with the brand-name drug in the same corporation.
Further results are that generic entrants that belong to the corporation that owns the
brand in the market are not more likely to deter other generics from entering.
2.2 Common ownership
There is some theoretical literature on common ownership, notably Azar (2017) and
Azar et al. (2017), which is grounded in studies analyzing the impact of cross-holdings -
when one firm has an ownership stake in another firm - including Reynolds and Snapp
(1986), Bresnahan and Salop (1986) and O’Brien and Salop (2000). These models
can be extended to common ownership, which show then that common ownership of
competitors reduces incentives to compete as the gains of aggressive competition to
one firm come at the expense of other firms in the investors’ portfolio. Consequently,
common ownership is predicted to lead to higher prices and boost industry profits.
On the other hand, Lopez and Vives (2017) find that cost-reducing R&D investment
with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly may lead to higher welfare when there is higher
common ownership.
Previous empirical studies on common ownership have mainly focused on the price
effects of common ownership. In an empirical study, Azar et al. (2017) regress airline
prices on a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index (which provides a measure of the
extent of common ownership at a market level) and a set of controls, and find that airline
ticket prices are 3-10% higher due to common ownership. Subsequently two papers have
sought to replicate the results of Azar et al. (2017), using different methodologies that
are better able to account for the endogeneity of common ownership (Kennedy et al,
2017; Gramlich & Grundl, 2017). These papers directly analyze the weights that firms
place on each other’s profits rather than using measures of industry concentration. No
effect of common ownership on prices is found.
There are also some recent studies that highlight the positive effects that common
ownership can have on market outcomes. Aghion at al. (2013) find that institutional
ownership drives innovation. Geng et al. (2015) find that shareholder overlap across
firms helps to mitigate patent hold-up problems, which in turn is correlated with more
innovation. Freeman (2016) finds that common ownership between upstream and down-
stream firms can strength supply chain relationships.
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3 Theoretical framework
We now present a simple framework to understand the effects of common ownership
between an incumbent and potential entrants. We model, in particular, the decisions of
the “generic firms” that have the possibility to manufacture and sell a generic drug and
thus enter a market currently dominated by a “brand firm” that manufactures and sells
the branded drug. This section focuses on the case of a single potential entrant but we
analyze the case of multiple entrants in Section 7. We also propose several measures of
common ownership based on prior literature.
3.1 Basic model
We make the following standard assumptions. Entry increases the market profits of the
generic firm G, from zero to piG > 0, but reduces the profits of the brand firm B, from
piMB (monopoly) to pi
D
B (duopoly) with ∆piB ≡ piDB − piMB < 0. We posit that the gains
obtained by the generic firm are lower than the losses incurred by the brand firm, as
competition reduces brand firm prices and profits enormously. As a result, although
generic firm profits increase, piG > 0, joint profits decrease with entry, piG + ∆piB < 0.
Common ownership between the generic and the brand firm makes the entry decision
non-trivial. Indeed, shareholders of the generic firm that also own shares in the brand
firm may care, not only about the (increase in) profits of the generic firm, but also
about the reduction of joint profits. A key issue, discussed below, is how common
ownership affects decision-making. For the moment, let us denote by δ the weight that
decision-makers of the generic firm place on joint (rather than on individual) profits as
a result of common ownership. As a result of this, entry will only occur if the net gains
are positive, i.e., as long as
(1− δ)piG + δ(piG + ∆piB) > 0. (1)
In the absence of common ownership, decision makers should place no weight on
joint profits (δ = 0) and entry is profitable (as piG > 0 ).
5 At the other extreme, in
the case common ownership is so high that joint profits are equally important than
individual generic firm profits (δ = 1), entry is not profitable (as piG+∆piB < 0). Entry
is reduced by an increase in the level of common ownership between the two firms (as
∆piB < 0). Notice that an alternative interpretation of the weight on joint rather than
5Note that piG may include “other” costs of entry, and thus piG is the net gain which we assume is
positive.
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on individual profits is equivalent to the importance of the change in profits of the brand
drug firm relative to the profits of the generic firm profits, as (1) can be rewritten as
piG + δ∆piB > 0. (2)
Summarising the key result of this subsection:
Proposition 1. Higher levels of common ownership between the generic and the brand
firm lowers the incentives to enter of the generic firm.
3.2 Measures of common ownership
Following previous literature, we now propose several measures to parametrize the im-
pact of common ownership levels on δ. We thus propose several ways in which investor
holdings can affect decision-making. Our empirical results are robust to multiple meas-
ures of common ownership.6
Production function approach This approach assumes that there exists a “pro-
duction function” that transforms each investor’s shareholdings in the two firms (two
inputs) onto the weight that the investor places on joint rather than on individual profits
(output), and that these weights add up to the weight placed by the decision-makers.
In formal terms, there exists a function f such that
δ =
∑
jf(γjG, γjB)
where γjG and γjB are the shareholdings of a “common” shareholder j that owns shares
in the two firms. Naturally, the marginal effect of each of the two arguments of f
should be positive (non-negative) but there should be some degree of complementarity
between the two. In other words, the marginal effect of the shareholding in one firm is
larger if the shareholding in the other is higher. As two extreme (production function)
examples (Gilje et al., 2018), the two shareholdings can be perfect substitutes (no
complementarities), i.e.,
f(γjG, γjB) = (γjG + γjB)/2, (3)
6Beyond our three main measures, we considered other measures of common ownership, including
the “maximum ownership stake” δM (Gilje et al.,2018), the “geometric average ownership stake” δG
(Gilje et al.,2018), and a variant of the measure used by Harford et al. (2011), δH . A description of
these additional measures and results using these measures can be found in an Appendix.
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or perfect complements, i.e.,
f(γjG, γjB) = min{γjG, γjB}. (4)
In both examples, the decision-makers shall place no weight on joint profits (δ = 0) if
there are no common shareholders, and they place full-weight on joint profits (δ = 1)
if all shareholders own the same fractions of shares in the two firms. But, example (3)
does not penalize unequal shareholdings in the two firms whereas example (4) does.
For instance, a shareholder that owns 5% of the shares of one firm and 15% of the other
would have the same contribution to δ as someone that owns 10% in both firms in (3)
but only half of it in (4).7 While (3) will most likely overstate the effect of common
shareholders, (4) will most likely understate it.
Another way of interpreting (3) is that it represents the fraction of ownership at the
pair level that is held in the hands of common investors. Hence it provides an indication
of the relative importance of common vs. non-common investors for the firm pair.
For both measures, by aggregating shareholdings across common investors, we are
also implicitly assuming that they can coordinate their collective decision making. This
is a reasonable assumption if common owners have similar interests. Research by Ficht-
ner et al. (2016) on the voting behaviour of BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street
indicates that these three large common investors tend to vote similarly in almost all
instances (more than 99% of votes for each of them). A case study of a shareholder
vote at the company DuPont also indicates how common investors can group together
and use the power of their large voting block to implement their objectives (Schmalz,
2015).
Weighted sum of interests approach This approach, following O’Brien and Salop
(2000), assumes that the decision-makers of the generic firm maximize a weighted sum
of the interests of the investors in the firm, where (i) the interests of an investor are given
by her shareholdings in the two firms and (ii) the weights are given by the investor’s
degree of control of the firm. As a result, common ownership will affect decision-making
because common owners have financial interests in both firms and exert some degree
of control on the generic firm decision-making. The interests of any (common or non-
common) shareholder i who has holdings γiG and γiB are given by γiGpiG + γiBpiB.
Assuming that control is proportional to ownership (the so-called proportional control
7Note that for the first case, it is crucial the definition of what is a common shareholder. A
shareholder with 100% and 0% would not count as a common shareholder, but someone with 100%
and 0.1% would give a coefficient of 49.05. That does not occur in the other two definitions
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model), the degree of control of the generic firm is given by γiG. Decision-makers of the
generic firm should maximize
∑
iγiG [γiGpiG + γiBpiB] ,
where γiG and γiB are the shareholdings of any shareholder i that owns shares in either
(or both) of the two firms. Straightforward algebra shows that maximizing this is
equivalent to maximizing
piG +
∑
iγiGγiB∑
iγ
2
iG
piB
and thus
δ =
∑
iγiGγiB∑
iγ
2
iG
can be thought of a measure of “common ownership”, as shown in (2). This measure
captures the importance of control in the generic firm and ownership in the brand firm
relative to control and ownership in the generic firm. See O’Brien and Waehrer (2017)
for a thorough discussion of this measure often called “lambda”.
4 Data
4.1 The pharma industry
Broadly speaking, pharmaceutical firms can be categorised as brand firms or generic
firms. Brand firms undertake costly research and development to discover new medic-
ations and bring them to market, and must apply for FDA approval through the new
drug application (NDA) procedure. Once a brand has received FDA approval, it is
awarded “data exclusivity” for a period of three, five or seven years.8 Data exclusivity
protects the underlying clinical data and runs concurrently with patent protection The
period that spans between the end of data exclusivity and the expiration of the last
patent is commonly referred to as “market exclusivity.”
Generic firms produce biologically identical replications of brand drugs at a much
lower cost, after they have already been marketed as brand-name products. Generic
firms are able to enter a particular drug market once the regulatory protections afforded
to the brand product have expired. During the market exclusivity period, generic
companies can challenge the monopoly rights of the brand in court for instance through
8The duration of the exclusivity period differs in the type of drug: orphan drugs receive 7 years;
generating antibiotics are eligible for 5 additional years; new chemical entities receive 5 years; new
clinical investigations receive 3 years; and the pediatric exclusivity adds 6 months of exclusivity.
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“paragraph IV” certification.9 Generic companies can also apply for FDA approval once
all patents are expired. In both instances, an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
must be submitted to the FDA.10 The protection conferred to new drugs is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Exclusivities and Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals
Notes: This figure illustrates the two types of protection awarded to new drugs. Data exclusivity
protects the underlying clinical data and runs concurrently with patent protection. At the end of
data exclusivity, a drug is protected only by its patents until they expire, a period termed “market
exclusivity.”
In line with Scott Morton (1999, 2000), we use FDA approval as an indicator of
entry. We consider a drug product market to be open for generic entry at the earlier
of either the date of first generic entry or the end of the market exclusivity period. We
term this point in time the “end of exclusivity.”
We focus on early entry and consider (simultaneous) entry that occurs within 18
months after the end of exclusivity. This is because the entire application process for
generic drugs takes about 18 months on average, depending on the application’s quality
and unexpected FDA delays (Scott Morton, 2000). Information on ANDA’s received by
the FDA is kept secret until approval; in this sense entry decisions are simultaneous.11
We obtain NDA and ANDA information from the FDA Orange Book. The FDA Or-
ange Book provides data on all launched pharmaceutical products in the United States
since 1982. The data includes information on the launching company, type of drug
(NDA or ANDA), patents associated, list of ingredients, dosage form, strength, ap-
proval date (which we convert into quarters) and status (prescription, over-the-counter,
9As an incentive, if this certification is obtained, the generic is granted the exclusive right to market
the generic drug for 180 days.
10A separate ANDA must be filed for each dosage form and strength.
11Our results are robust to other entry period definitions such as entry within one or two years after
the end of exclusivity.
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or discontinued).12 Information on the submission class of the brand product is merged
in from the “Drugs at FDA” database using the FDA application number.13 Data
concerning sales of brand drugs is taken from the website drugs.com.14 Additionally,
products are linked to their relevant therapeutic field using the ATC/DDD Index 2015
and applying exact text matching based on compound-name.15
We define product markets at the ingredient-form level.16 In the FDA Orange Book,
a drug product can in principle be identified as a unique ingredient-form-strength com-
bination. In total, the Orange Book reports 3964 products at the ingredient-form-
strength level that were launched from 1982 until 2017. We restricted the data in
multiple ways, as is explained in detail in the Data Appendix. We consider only drug
products that faced generic entry or patent expiry between 2004 and 2014, as this is
the range for which we have data on all relevant variables. The final dataset contains
451 prescription drug product markets that faced generic entry and/or patent expiry
between 2004 and 2014.
We match the brand company that produces the brand product (NDA) with the
full sample of potential generic entrants to form a drug product-brand-generic obser-
vation. The sample of potential generic entrants includes pharmaceutical companies
that launched at least one generic product in our drug markets. Results are robust
to different definitions of the entrant set. In an Appendix we provide results for the
case where we restrict the set of potential entrants to only those with experience in the
relevant drug form/route. Doing so means that we drop 61 actual entry observations.17
Hence we do not restrict the entrant set further in our main analysis.
12The Orange Book has been downloaded from the FDA website for each year (2001q4, 2002q4,...,
2017q4) using Internet Archive. In the current version of the Orange Book online the names of
companies have been partially back-dated to display the current manufacturer of a drug. To establish
the company name and drug status at the time of approval it was necessary to merge information from
multiple versions of the FDA Orange Book.
13The main submission classes include Type 1 New Molecular Entity, Type 2 New Active Ingredient,
Type 3 New Dosage Form, Type 4 New Combination, Type 5 New Formulation or Other Differences
(e.g., new indication, new applicant, new manufacturer).
14Drugs.com provides the annual US sales figures for the top 200 drugs for the years 2003 -2010
and the top 100 drugs for the years 2011- 2013.
15The ATC/DDD Index 2015 categorizes all chemical compounds used in any therapeutic field ac-
cording to a five-level hierarchical system, called the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Clas-
sification System. The highest level (ATC-1) consist of 14 anatomical main groups (e.g. Alimentray
Tract and Metabolism (A) or Cardiovascular System (C)). The next lower level (ATC-2) describes 88
therapeutic main groups (e.g. Drugs used in Diabetes (A10) or Diuretics (C03)). Lower levels make
even finer distinctions between products. The lowest level (ATC-5) indicates 3709 chemical substances.
16For example the drug with the brand-name Zyrtec in syrup form with the ingredient Cetirizine
Hydrochloride 5mg/5ml will be in the same product market as Zyrtec in syrup form with the ingredi-
ent Cetirizine Hydrochloride 10mg/10ml. However, the product Zyrtec Allergy with the ingredient
Cetirizine Hydrochloride 10mg in the form of a tablet is considered to be a different product market.
17This is 5% of all actual entry observations.
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4.2 Common ownership
We use the Thomson Reuters Global Ownership Database, which includes holdings by
each shareholder in each publicly listed firm for every year-quarter. For US-listed firms
Thomson Reuters collects ownership information from 13F, 13D and 13G filings. For
companies outside the US, information is sourced from stock exchange filings, trade
announcements, company websites, company annual reports and financial newspapers.
For each firm for each quarter in the period 2003-2014, we extracted data on the share-
holders that own at least 1% of the shares, and computed yearly ownership averages.
Figure 2 gives an example of the top 5 investors for the brand-generic pair Johnson &
Johnson-Mylan in 2014. As shown, in this pair common shareholders account for the
lion’s share of the ownership of the top 5 investors.
Brand Generic
Johnson & Johnson Mylan
BlackRock 6% Vanguard Group 7%
Vanguard Group 6% BlackRock 7%
State Street Global 5% Goldman Sachs Group 5%
Royal Bank of Canada 2% State Street Global 4%
Fidelity Investments 2% Wellington Mgmt. 4%
Source: Thomson Global Ownership Database
Table 1: Top 5 Largest Investors (2014)
Our measures of common ownership aim to capture the weight that the decision-
makers of the generic firm G place on the joint profits of the pair G-B. The empirical
counterparts of the three measures introduced in the theory section are as follows.
Firstly we use the production function measure that assumes that the shareholdings of
the common investors in the two firms are perfect substitutes:
δS =
∑
j(γjB + γjG)∑
i(γiB + γiG)
, (5)
where the numerator runs over the investors j that G and B have in common and
the denominator runs over all the investors in our database. As there are other in-
vestors (that own less than 1%), the denominator may be different from 2. We also
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use the production function measure that assumes that the shareholdings are perfect
complements:
δC =
∑
j min{γjB, γjG}. (6)
Lastly, we use the measure that assumes that decision-makers of the generic firm max-
imise a weighted sum of the interests of the firm:
δL =
∑
i γiBγiG∑
i γ
2
iG
. (7)
For private firms, i.e. not listed on a stock-exchange, we assume that they do not
have common investors with any other firm. For firms with a presence in the UK, we
verified that this assumption holds true using annual return filings with full shareholder
list also available for private firms from the company registry (Companies House).
Subsidiaries are assigned the ownership structure of their parent firm. Subsidiaries
are identified on the basis of public information, including company websites, as well as
on the basis of the Thomson Reuters database. We consider a firm X to be subsidiary
of a firm Y if firm Y has more than 50% direct ownership stake of firm X. We can also
identify cross-ownership links, i.e., when one firm has an ownership stake of less than
50% in another firm. However there are only three pairs in the dataset where the brand
has a stake-holding in the potential generic entrant (Daiichi-Ranbaxy, Galderma-Alcon
and Novartis-Alcon) and only one pair where the potential generic entrant has a stake-
holding in the brand (Taro-Sun). As this ends up being too few observations to draw
meaningful statistical conclusions, we do not consider these links in the analysis.
We pay particular attention to the case in which the potential generic entrant is a
subsidiary of the brand firm. We create an indicator variable, named Subsidiary, that
takes on the value 1 if the potential generic entrant is a subsidiary of the brand and 0
if it is not. In the former, the common ownership variables are set to zero.
In the main specification we will report results using common ownership measured
in the year prior to the end of exclusivity. Indeed, entry requires time to acquire an
approved source of materials and suitable production facilities. About one to two years
before filing an ANDA application, the generic firm starts preparing to enter (Reiffen
and Ward, 2005).18
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the common ownership measures over time. We only
include the company-pairs that are observed for the entire period, as this provides a
18Since it is unclear at exactly what point time the final entry decision of the generic firm is made,
we also checked that our results are robust to the use of common ownership measured two and zero
years prior to the end of exclusivity.
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robust overview of how the degree of connectedness between brand and generic pairs
has changed over time. It is evident that on average common ownership has increased
significantly from 2003 to 2014. The growth of common ownership was low, but still
positive, until the beginning of 2010 and then, starting from 2011, the average level of
common ownership almost doubled in the last years of the sample.19
Figure 2: Evolution of common ownership
4.3 Sample and variables
Our final sample consists of 451 drug product markets and 58,737 drug product-brand-
generic observations. In total there are 102 unique brand companies (of which 77 are
publicly listed at some time point) and 145 unique generic companies (of which 69 are
publicly listed at some time point). There are 13,954 unique pairs. Pairs may enter
and exit the sample over time depending on whether companies in the pair enter (by
incorporation) or exit the sample (by acquisition or bankruptcy). On average there are
131 potential generic entrants per market. This is comparable with previous studies:
in Scott Morton (1999) there are 123 potential generic entrants per drug market and
in data sample 1 in Appelt (2015) there are 100 potential entrants per drug market.
Table 2 gives an example of the structure of our data in terms of drug market,
brand firm, potential generic entrants, entry and common ownership measures. The
example relates to the drug Ultracet which is an analgesic produced by the company
19This trend also holds when we restrict our attention to only those pairs where both brand and
generic are publicly held companies.
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Janssen, which is a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. The relevant market is defined
by the ingredients (acetaminophen; tramadol hydrochloride) and dosage form (tablet;
oral). The patent associated with Ultracet expired in 2011q3. Entry is defined within
18 months of the end of market exclusivity, in this case between 2011q3 and 2013q1.
According to this definition the generics Barr and Amneal (as well as others not shown)
have entered the market. The common ownership measures correspond to those of the
year 2010.
obs. trade name ingredients dosage form brand generic entrant entry δ - Subst. δ - Comp. δ - Lambda
1 ultracet acetaminophen; tramadol hydrochl. tablet; oral JANSSEN BAXTER 0 0,62 0,21 0,65
2 ultracet acetaminophen; tramadol hydrochl. tablet; oral JANSSEN BARR 1 0,53 0,15 0,41
3 ultracet acetaminophen; tramadol hydrochl. tablet; oral JANSSEN TARO 0 0,26 0,07 0,12
4 ultracet acetaminophen; tramadol hydrochl. tablet; oral JANSSEN SANDOZ 0 0,05 0,01 0,02
5 ultracet acetaminophen; tramadol hydrochl. tablet; oral JANSSEN AMNEAL 1 0 0 0
6 ultracet acetaminophen; tramadol hydrochl. tablet; oral JANSSEN AKORN 0 0 0 0
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
Table 2: Data Structure
Following prior literature (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988; Scott Morton, 1999; Kyle, 2000;
Hudson, 2000; Saha et al., 2006; Regan, 2008; Glowicka et al., 2009; Moreno-Torres et
al., 2009: Appelt, 2015), we control for drug market and generic firm characteristics.
The drug market characteristics include a set of indicator variables for the pre-market-
entry sales of the brand product. Sales Rank (1-10) takes the value 1 if the brand drug
ranks in the top 10 drugs in terms of US sales in the year before the end of exclusivity.
Sales Rank (11-50) and Sales Rank (51-100) are defined in a similar manner. The in-
dicator variable Authorised Generic takes on the value 1 if the brand firm has launched
an authorised generic in that particular market. We also take into account the intens-
ity of inter-molecular competition in the therapeutic field (Appelt, 2015; Regan, 2008).
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) provides a count of the number of on-patent substitutive
active ingredients listed in the same therapeutic field at the ATC-2 level in the quarter
prior to the end of exclusivity.20 Similarly Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) measures
the number of off-patent substitutive active ingredients. Further market characterist-
ics include the therapeutic field of the drug (at the ATC-2 level), submission type of
the brand firm,21 drug form/route (defined as oral, injection, topical, ophthalmic or
20Whereas the ATC-3 level is most in line with market definition in M&A approval procedures in
Europe and the United States, through the matching process one drug may be linked with numerous
therapeutic classes at the ATC3 level. To ensure that we obtain a unique therapeutic for each drug,
we use the broader market definition of ATC2.
21New dosage form, new molecular entity or new active ingredient, new formulation or other differ-
ences, or new combination.
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inhalation) and the year of the end of exclusivity.
Generic firm characteristics aim to capture the prior experience of the generic in the
relevant market. Controlling for generic firm characteristics has shown to be crucial
in previous studies (Scott Morton, 1999; Scott Morton, 2002; Kyle, 2006). Experi-
ence Route serves as a proxy for the potential entrant’s experience in the brand drug
form/route by counting the number of products with identical route of administration
previously launched by the generic one quarter prior to the end of exclusivity. Sim-
ilarly Experience ATC2 serves as a proxy of the entrant’s experience in the relevant
therapeutic field at the ATC-2 level. Experience New Drug is constructed as a count of
the entrant’s previously launched new drugs. Generic entrants that are also active in
producing new drugs may hold some patents that ease entry. Breadth (ATC2) accounts
for the breadth of the generic entrant’s portfolio by counting the number of distinct
ATC-2 markets in which the generic has been active in one quarter prior to the end
of exclusivity. The variables concerning generic firm experience and substitutes are
calculated using the full FDA Orange Book. Counts start in 1994, 10 years before the
start of the sample.22
Table 3 outlines the key characteristics for the 451 entry opportunities. The uncon-
ditional probability of entry is 2%. Hence the vast majority of potential generic entrants
do not enter.23 111 out of 451 markets (25%) experience no entry within 18 months. In
26% of the markets the brand has launched a generic itself, i.e. an authorised generic.
In terms of brand revenues, 2% of drug markets are ranked in the top 10 drugs in terms
of sales in the year prior to the end of exclusivity, 7% are ranked in the top 11-50, and
7% are in the top 51-100 drugs. On average a potential generic entrant has launched 13
generic products of the same route/form as the brand and is active in 11 therapeutic
fields.
22Results are robust to other starting points.
23This is similar to previous studies: in Scott Morton (1999) 2-7% of entry opportunities are realised,
in Kyle (2006) 2.5% of entry opportunities are realised, and in Appelt (2015) 10% of entry opportunities
are realised.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Entry (0/1) 58737 0.02 0.14 0 1
δS 58737 0.074 0.15 0 0.868
δC 58737 0.021 0.051 0 0.366
δL 58737 0.062 0.16 0 1.365
Subsidiary (0/1) 58737 0.002 0.045 0 1
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 58737 0.022 0.146 0 1
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 58737 0.069 0.253 0 1
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 58737 0.067 0.251 0 1
Authorised Generic (0/1) 58737 0.26 0.439 0 1
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) ÷10 58737 2.325 1.669 0 7.3
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) ÷10 58737 1.6 1.31 0 6.1
Experience Route ÷10 58737 1.305 3.086 0 29.9
Experience ATC2 ÷10 58737 0.07 0.223 0 3.2
Experience New Drug ÷10 58737 0.179 0.424 0 2.8
Breadth (ATC2) ÷10 58737 1.135 1.204 0 6.1
Table 3: Summary Statistics
5 Empirical implementation
We determine which generic firms are more likely to enter a given drug market. The
binary dependent variable contains the market entry decision of the generic firm. The
resulting equation to be estimated is:
Pr[EntryGm = 1] = β0 + βδGm + ηZm + γXGm + αm + Gm (8)
EntryGm takes on the value 1 when generic G enters market m (ingredient-form) within
18 months after the end of exclusivity (defined as the earlier of last patent expiry date
and first generic entry). δGm is one of the measures of common ownership between the
generic firm and the brand for the product market, where δGm can be δS, δC or δL. Zm
is a vector of market characteristics, including market size as measured by pre-generic-
entry sales, an indicator for the presence of an authorised generic, the number of patent
protected inter-molecular substitutes in the same therapeutic field and the number of off
patent inter-molecular substitutes in same therapeutic field. XGm is a vector of generic-
market characteristics, including generic’s previous experience with drug from/route,
generic’s previous experience with the therapeutic class defined at ATC-2 level, generic’s
previous experience with new drugs, number of therapeutic fields in which the generic
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has experience and region of generic’s company headquarters (e.g. Southern Asia).24
Fixed effects αm are included for drug dosage form, submission type, therapeutic field
(ATC-2 code) and year of the end of exclusivity.
We first estimate a linear probability model (LPM). In our case a LPM model is
able to estimate more parameters than a probit model. In the case of the probit model
certain dummy variables perfectly predict the outcome hence these observations are
dropped.25 Coefficients for the probit and logit models are also reported.
The coefficient β measures the impact of common ownership between the brand
and the generic on the generic’s entry decision. If institutional investors adjust their
holdings in response to entry opportunities (at the ingredient-form level), common own-
ership might be endogenous. For example if investors in the brand increase investment
in generics with entry plans, common ownership between the brand and generic will
increase before entry, causing β to be biased upward.
To address endogeneity concerns, we also perform IV estimations and instrument
for common ownership with financial index membership at the pair level.26 We use the
holdings included in the iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) ETF during the 2006-2014
period. The fund, launched in 2006 and managed by BlackRock, tracks the investment
results of the Dow Jones U.S. Select Pharmaceutical Index, which in turn is designed
to measure the performance of the pharmaceutical sector of the US equity market.
The Dow Jones US Select Pharmaceutical Index includes a wide range of pharmaceut-
ical companies including both brand and generic companies. According to BlackRock
(2017), the IHE fund generally invests at least 90% of its assets in securities or other
financial instruments related to the Dow Jones U.S. Select Pharmaceutical Index.
On average, the fund has been comprised of 39 holdings over time, each allocated a
specific weight that changes over time.27 Since May 2006 each company has been listed
on the exchange-traded fund for an average of 4 years. This evidences the pattern of
24Regions are defined as Australasia, Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, Northern America, Northern
Europe, South-eastern Europe, Southern Asia, Southern Europe, Western Asia, Western Europe.
25As noted by Caudill (1988) if the model contains a dummy variable for membership in some
group, and every member of the group has the same value for the dependent variable, the coefficient
of the group dummy variable cannot be estimated in logit or probit models, but can be estimated in
the linear probability model.
26A similar approach has been applied by several other papers in the literature. For example Aghion
(2013) use the inclusion of a firm in the S&P 500 as an instrument for institutional ownership. Bena et
al. (2017) instrument foreign institutional ownership with stock additions and deletions to the MSCI
All Country World Index. Schmidt and Fahlenbach (2017) instrument passive institutional ownership
with switches between the Russel 1000 and Russel 2000 indexes. They argue that investors tracking
the Russel 1000 index will significantly increase their holdings in firms that switch from the Russel
2000 to the Russel 1000 index.
27The relative weightings are computed using the market-cap methodology whereby the securities
are valued according to their total market capitalization.
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entry and exit of the fund which has been marked by various periods of high entrance
and exit (e.g., more than 6 companies dropped out and entered the fund in the last
quarter of 2013 and the third quarter of 2015, respectively) and periods of no change.
We construct a set of instrumental variables. The instrument that we use in the main
specification is the variable Index Periods. Index Periods is constructed by adding up
the number of quarters that both firms have appeared in the index up until one year
prior to the end of exclusivity.28 We expect that the longer both companies are present
in the IHE index, the more investment in both companies will increase by investors
that track the Dow Jones U.S. Select Pharmaceutical Index, leading to higher common
ownership levels. The identifying assumption is that inclusion in the exchange-traded
fund, which mirrors the pharmaceutical index, is exogenous to market entry, except
through its effect on common ownership. This is the case provided that the index is
not created with potential entry opportunities in mind (at the ingredient-form level)
and that, controlling for other factors, addition to the index does not directly affect
entry decisions except through common ownership.
We further construct an additional instrument based on the pharmaceutical company
headquarters. The instrument Same Region takes on the value 1 when both companies
in the pair have headquarters located in the same geographic region and 0 when the
regions differ.29 We expect that companies with headquarters in the same region will
have higher common ownership due to regionally focused investors (see Appendix).
That is, if both companies are located in Southern Asia the pair is likely to have higher
common ownership than if one company was located in Southern Asia and the other in
Northern America. The identifying assumption is that whether or not the brand and
generic headquarters are in the same region does not directly affect the entry decision.
6 Results
Table 4 presents the main results for the OLS and IV estimations with our three common
ownership measures. First off, the control variables carry the expected signs; higher pre-
entry brand sales, fewer on-patent molecular substitutes and greater entrant experience
28Further instrumental variables that were constructed include; Index Presence which is an indicator
variable that is 1 if one or both companies are included in the exchange-traded fund, Index Companies
which counts the number of companies that are present in the fund and thereby can take on the values
0, 1 or 2 and Index Weights which sums the weights of each pair of companies and indicates their
relative financial importance for every period.
29The regions in sample are defined as Australasia, Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, Northern Amer-
ica, Northern Europe, South-eastern Europe, Southern Asia, Southern Europe, West Asia and Western
Europe.
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all significantly increase the likelihood of entry. We find that the launch of an authorised
generic and the number of molecular substitutes off-patent do not have a significant
impact on generic entry. These results are similar to Appelt (2015) who finds that
on-patent substitutes have a negative and significant effect, off-patent substitutes do
not have a significant effect, and authorised generics do not have a significant effect on
generic entry.
More importantly for this study, the coefficient on δ across all measures is negative
and significant. Thus we find that common ownership between the brand and generic
indeed reduces the likelihood of generic entry.30 The coefficient on common ownership
should be interpreted bearing in mind the unconditional probability of entry for the
sample.31 The unconditional probability of entry for the sample of firms and markets is
2%. Focusing on the OLS estimations, an increase of one standard deviation as meas-
ured by δS implies a 0.15× 0.012 = 0.0018 percentage point decrease in the probability
of entry, ceteris parabis. This is therefore a 0.0018/0.02 = 9% reduction in the uncon-
ditional probability of entry. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation in δC and
δL imply an 11% and 13% decrease, respectively, in the probability of entry.
For the IV estimations, the first-stage results indicate that both instruments are
highly relevant and positively correlated with δ. However we cannot reject the hypo-
thesis that δ is exogenous for all measures of δ (see Appendix). The IV results suggest
an even more negative effect of common ownership on entry.
The effect of common ownership is smaller than the effect of being a subsidiary of
the brand. For example, if δS is 1, that is the brand and generic share all the same
common owners, then the probability of entry falls by 1.2 percentage points, whereas
if the relationship is parent-subsidiary the probability of entry falls by 4 percentage
points. This finding suggests that while in theory complete common ownership by
multiple shareholders could be identical to full ownership, our results suggest that in
reality, this may not be the case.
The size of the coefficient on δS can also be compared to the effect of an increase
in market experience. The impact of having launched an additional 10 products of the
same route/form as the brand product prior to entry, is to increase the probability of
entry by 0.8 percentage points.
30This result is robust to different specifications including logit and probit specifications, different
entrant sets, measuring common ownership at different time points and additional measures of common
ownership (see Appendix).
31Like Scott Morton (2002), we find that controlling for generic experience is crucial. The addition
of generic market experience variables changes the sign on δ from positive to negative (see Appendix).
Hence, only once generic experience has been taken into consideration, does common ownership reduce
the likelihood of generic entry.
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In Table 5 we present results where common ownership is specified as a categorical
variable. We specify common ownership as a categorical variable in order to investigate
whether greater levels of common ownership have a larger impact; i.e., whether the
relationship between common ownership and entry is not linear. We focus on the
measure δS. This measure can be interpreted as the fraction of total ownership in the
pair held by common investors, and hence presents natural thresholds. We construct 3
categorical variables based on the value of δS: δS(0 < δ ≤ 0.3) takes on the value 1 if
δS ∈]0; 0.3], δS(0.3 < δ ≤ 0.5) takes on the value 1 if δS ∈]0.3; 0.5], and δS(0.5 < δ ≤ 1)
takes on the value 1 if δS ∈]0.5; 1].
The results in Table 5 indicate that the effect of common ownership increases the
greater the level of common ownership. The coefficients on each categorical variable
increase in magnitude (become more negative) with higher common ownership. Only
once δS is greater than 0.5 does the negative effect of common ownership on entry prob-
ability become significant. This result is robust across IV, probit and logit specifications
(see Appendix for the latter two specifications). A change from zero common ownership
to common ownership of greater than 0.5 reduces the entry probability of a generic by
0.9 percentage points on average. This is a 50% decline in the unconditional probability
of entry. In our sample we find that there are 669 unique brand-generic pairs with a δS
of greater than 0.5 at some point is time. This is 5% of all brand-generic pairs.
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OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δS -0.0121*** -0.0234**
(0.00437) (0.0116)
δC -0.0422*** -0.0601**
(0.0130) (0.0291)
δL -0.0166*** -0.0187**
(0.00400) (0.00952)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.0411*** -0.0406*** -0.0411*** -0.0427*** -0.0412*** -0.0413***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0219*** 0.0219*** 0.0218*** 0.0221*** 0.0220*** 0.0218***
(0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00620) (0.00620) (0.00619)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0224*** 0.0225*** 0.0224*** 0.0224***
(0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00366) (0.00365) (0.00365)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0177*** 0.0178*** 0.0177*** 0.0178*** 0.0179*** 0.0177***
(0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308)
Authorised Generic (0/1) 0.000922 0.000928 0.000930 0.000870 0.000907 0.000924
(0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.00445** -0.00448** -0.00444** -0.00454** -0.00453** -0.00445**
(0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00183) (0.00183)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.000814 -0.000788 -0.000827 -0.000762 -0.000753 -0.000821
(0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152)
Experience Route 0.00835*** 0.00834*** 0.00836*** 0.00835*** 0.00834*** 0.00836***
(0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564)
Experience ATC2 0.0602*** 0.0602*** 0.0601*** 0.0601*** 0.0601*** 0.0601***
(0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699)
Experience New Drug 0.00434* 0.00431** 0.00475** 0.00549** 0.00483** 0.00496**
(0.00222) (0.00217) (0.00219) (0.00233) (0.00221) (0.00224)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00325*** 0.00333*** 0.00329*** 0.00343*** 0.00345*** 0.00332***
(0.000920) (0.000924) (0.000920) (0.000946) (0.000947) (0.000935)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0296*** 0.0293*** 0.0292*** 0.0299*** 0.0293*** 0.0292***
(0.00674) (0.00674) (0.00674) (0.00676) (0.00673) (0.00673)
Observations 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737
Drug Markets 451 451 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry within 18 months. The instruments are
the number of periods listed in the ETF iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the
value 1 when the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same region. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 4: Main Specification
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OLS IV
δS (0 < δ ≤ 0.3) 0.00320* -0.00420
(0.00180) (0.00311)
δS (0.3 < δ ≤ 0.5) -0.00322 -0.00581
(0.00288) (0.00387)
δS (δ > 0.5) -0.00919*** -0.0109**
(0.00335) (0.00438)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.0394*** -0.0422***
(0.0102) (0.0103)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0218*** 0.0219***
(0.00619) (0.00619)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0224*** 0.0223***
(0.00364) (0.00364)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0176*** 0.0178***
(0.00308) (0.00308)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.00104 0.000904
(0.00151) (0.00151)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.00434** -0.00452**
(0.00183) (0.00183)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.000906 -0.000802
(0.00152) (0.00151)
Experience Route 0.00838*** 0.00834***
(0.000564) (0.000564)
Experience ATC2 0.0603*** 0.0602***
(0.00698) (0.00699)
Experience New Drug 0.00365 0.00496**
(0.00224) (0.00227)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00292*** 0.00342***
(0.000928) (0.000955)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes
Constant 0.0280*** 0.0308***
(0.00679) (0.00689)
Observations 58,737 58,737
Drug markets 451 451
R-squared 0.079 0.079
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The depend-
ent variable is entry within 18 months. The instruments are the
number of periods listed in the ETF iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical
(IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 when
the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same
region. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5: Categorical Variables Specification
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7 Multiple entrants
We now extend the basic framework to take into account that several generic firms
may be deciding whether to enter the market of the brand firm. We first show in a
theoretical framework with two generic potential entrants that the classical result of
entry decisions being strategic substitutes may be reversed in the presence of common
ownership. Indeed, for high levels of common ownership entry decisions become strategic
complements.
We then show that the results of the basic model on the effects of common ownership
on entry of the focal generic firm extend to the case of multiple generics: an increase in
the level of common ownership between the focal generic firm and brand firm reduces
the likelihood of entry of the generic. We thereafter show that the likelihood of entry of
the focal generic firm is increased (reduced) by the degree of common ownership of the
other generic if and only if entry decisions are characterised by strategic substitutability
(complementarity). Further, although the overall effect of the other generic’s degree of
common ownership on the likelihood of entry by the focal generic may be ambiguous,
it is more likely to be negative and decrease the likelihood of entry of a generic firm if
its own degree of common ownership is large, i.e. the interaction effect is negative.
We test these predictions in an empirical setup where we select as other potential
generic entrant the most experienced generic competitor. In this setup, we find con-
firmation that our main result still holds: an increase in the level of common ownership
between the focal generic firm and brand firm reduces the likelihood of entry of this
generic. Further, we find some evidence that, on average, entry decisions are charac-
terised by strategic substitutability. Moreover, interaction effects are indeed negative.
Finally, in a thought exercise where we assume that common ownership between the
brand and both generic potential entrants is symmetric, we find that, again in line with
our theoretical framework, for common ownership above 0.45 entry decisions become
strategic complements.
7.1 Model
Two symmetric (risk-neutral) generic firms, G and G′, can enter the market of the
product of the brand firm B. As before, denote the weight placed by the decision-
makers of the generic firms G and G′ on joint profits with brand firm B (rather than on
individual generic firm) profits by δ and δ′, respectively. Denote the profits of the generic
firms k = G,G′ in a market structure m = D or T , denoting duopoly and triopoly, as
pimk and the change in profits of the brand firm B from monopoly to duopoly and from
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duopoly to triopoly as ∆piDB ≡ piDB −piMB and ∆piTB ≡ piTB−piDB , respectively. We assume,
as before, that ∆piDB < 0 and ∆pi
T
B < 0 but, as the reduction of profits decrease with
the number of entrants, ∆piDB < ∆pi
T
B. We also assume away collusion.
Extending the reasoning of the basic model, and denoting the probability that the
competitor of firm G (i.e. G′) enters as p, generic firm G should enter the market as
long as the net gains of entry (or the “incentives” to enter) ΠG > 0, where
ΠG(p, δ) ≡ (1− p)piDG + ppiTG + δ[(1− p)∆piDB + p∆piTB]. (9)
Notice that in the case in which the probability of G′ entering is zero, p = 0, this
condition reduces to piDG + δ∆pi
D
B > 0, as in equation (2) in our basic model. Here,
the probability that the generic firm G enters, which we shall denote by p′ (as it is
the competitor of firm G′), may depend on p and δ. Similarly, p depends on p′ and δ′.
Indeed, the generic firm G′ will enter as long as ΠG′ > 0, where
ΠG′(p
′, δ′) ≡ (1− p′)piDG′ + p′piTG′ + δ′[(1− p′)∆piDB + p′∆piTB]. (10)
7.2 Entry decisions: strategic complements or substitutes?
We now show that entry decisions are not necessarily strategic substitutes in the pres-
ence of common ownership.
To understand how the incentives to enter of generic firm G change as the generic
firm G′ is more likely to enter, we derive ΠG in (9) with respect to p:
∂ΠG(p, δ)/∂p = −(piDG − piTG) + δ(∆piTB −∆piDB ). (11)
We can identify two effects. The first term is negative and as result, firm G has less
incentives to enter if company G′ is more likely to enter. This is the traditional (non-
common ownership) result of entry decisions being strategic substitutes. The second
term is positive, and thus pulls in the other direction. As the other generic is more
likely to enter, the effect on the brand company’s profits is more likely to be from
duopoly to triopoly rather than from monopoly to duopoly. This is of course less of
a concern, given that the reduction in profits decreases with the number of entrants,
i.e.,∆piTB > ∆pi
D
B .
Because of the common ownership between the generic firm and the brand product
company, the traditional result of strategic substitutabilities can be reversed. In par-
ticular, when ∂ΠG(p, δ)/∂p > 0, then entry decisions are strategic complements. The
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trade-off can be understood as a balance between the (negative) first derivative with
respect to the number of firms on the profits of the two-generic firms (first term) against
the (positive) second derivatives on the profits of the branded product company (second
term). In particular, for a high enough level of common ownership
δ > δ∗ ≡ −(piDG − piTG)/(∆piTB −∆piDB ), (12)
∂ΠG(p, δ)/∂p > 0 and entry decisions are characterised by strategic complementarities.
Summarising,
Proposition 2. For a high enough levels of common ownership, entry decisions are
characterised by strategic complementarities.
7.3 Comparative statics
This section presents the comparative static predictions of the levels of common own-
ership of the two generic firms on the decision to enter of one of them, as well as the
predicted interacted effects. We make use of the strategic interactions between the
decisions of the two generics studied in the previous section to take into account the
indirect effects.
Effects of common ownership of the focal generic firm We first show that the
results of the basic model extend to the case of multiple generics. Namely, an increase
in the level of common ownership decreases the incentive to enter of the focal generic
firm.
Notice first that an increase in δ will negatively affect ΠG, as ∂ΠG/∂δ = [(1 −
p)∆piDB + p∆pi
T
B] < 0, but it will not affect ΠG′ nor, thus, p directly. In formal terms,
by the chain rule,
∂ΠG(p, δ)/∂δ = ∂ΠG/∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q0
∗ ∂p/∂δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ ∂ΠG/∂δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0. (13)
Second, the equilibrium effects reinforce the direct effect, although the channel depends
on whether entry decisions are strategic complements or substitutes. In the case where
they are strategic substitutes, a decrease in the incentives to enter of G, i.e. a reduction
of p′, implies an increase in ΠG′ and thus of p, which will reduce ΠG and thus p′ further.
Repeating the process, we get less entry of firm G. Similarly, in case where they are
strategic complements, a decrease in the incentives to enter of G, i.e. a reduction of
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p′, implies a reduction in ΠG′ and thus of p, which reduces ΠG and thus p′ further.
Repeating the process, we again get less entry of firm G. Summarising,
Proposition 3. Higher levels of common ownership between the focal generic firm and
the brand firm lower the incentives to enter of this generic firm.
Effects of common ownership of the other generic firm We now show that
an increase in the level of common ownership of the other firm with the brand firm
increases (decreases) the incentive to enter of a given generic firm if and only if entry
decisions are strategic substitutes (strategic complements).
Suppose first that entry decisions are strategic substitutes. An increase in δ′ does
not affect ΠG directly, ∂ΠG/∂δ
′ = 0, but it reduces ΠG′ and thus p, which in turn
increases ΠG. In formal terms,
∂ΠG(p, δ)/∂δ
′ = ∂ΠG/∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∗ ∂p/∂δ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂ΠG/∂δ
′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
> 0 (14)
In terms of equilibrium effects, an increase in ΠG and thus in p
′ implies that p is reduced
further, which in turn increases ΠG and p
′ further. Repeating the process, we have more
entry of firm G.
Suppose, second, that entry decisions are strategic complements. As before, an
increase in δ′ does not affect ΠG directly but it reduces ΠG′ and thus p:
∂ΠG(p, δ)/∂δ
′ = ∂ΠG/∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∗ ∂p/∂δ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂ΠG/∂δ
′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
< 0 (15)
In terms of equilibrium effects, a decrease in ΠG and in thus p
′ implies that p is
reduced further, which in turn decreases ΠG and p
′ further. Repeating the process, we
have less entry of firm G. Summarising,
Proposition 4. Higher levels of common ownership between the other generic firm and
the brand firm lower (increases) the incentives to enter of the focal generic firm if and
only if entry decisions are strategic substitutes (strategic complements).
Interaction effects We now investigate how the effect of common ownership of a
given firm on entry depends on the level of common ownership of the other firm. We
show, on the one hand, that the effect of δ on entry is more negative as δ′ changes.
Similarly, the effect of δ′ is relatively more negative as δ increases. In absolute terms,
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the effect of δ′ is positive for low levels of δ (e.g. when δ = 0) and negative for high
levels of δ.
To understand how the effects of δ on the probability of entry of G change as we
increase δ′, we take the derivative of (13) with respect to δ′:
∂2ΠG(p, δ)/∂δ∂δ
′ = ∂2ΠG/∂p∂δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∗ ∂p/∂δ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂2ΠG/∂δ∂δ
′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
< 0.
The first term is positive because, deriving (12) with respect to δ, we have that
∂2ΠG/∂p∂δ = ∆pi
T
B −∆piDB > 0. Although the effect of p on the incentives to enter of
firm G may be ambiguous, ∂ΠG/∂p T 0, it should be relatively more complementary
as δ increases. As a result of this, the effect of δ′ on the probability of entry of G
is relatively more negative as we increase δ. But the absolute effect may be positive
or negative. Indeed, in the case in which δ = 0, then ∂ΠG/∂p < 0 and, using (14),
∂ΠG(p, δ)/∂δ
′ > 0. Summarising,
Proposition 5. The interaction effect of common ownership of the generic firms and
the brand firm is negative. Therefore, higher levels of common ownership of the other
generic firm make the effect of common ownership of the focal generic firm more neg-
ative.
7.4 Empirical implementation and results
Table 6 presents the results of specifications where we include a measure of common
ownership for another generic entrant G′ with the brand. We take a pragmatic approach
and calculate δ′ as the level of common ownership between the brand in the market
and the most experienced potential generic entrant. We reason that potential generic
entrants are likely to consider the most experienced other potential generic entrant as a
viable entry candidate, and hence are likely to take the common ownership of this firm
with the brand into consideration. We identify the most experienced potential generic
entrant as the firm that has the highest previous experience at the drug form/route
level for the given drug market as measured by the variable Experience Route.32
Our results are in line with the theory outlined above. First, we find that the
coefficient on δ is negative and significant for our three different ownership measures
32Since we consider a large set of potential entrants in our empirical analysis (on average 131 per
market) it would not be feasible to include measures of δ′ for all other potential entrants. Moreover
aggregating measures of δ′ for a large set of potential entrants is likely to provide a meaningless
statistic; whereas for the econometrician it is difficult to restrict to the set of potential entrants
based on observable characteristics, for generic entrants it may be more clear which other generics are
candidates to enter a specific drug market.
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in all specifications. In other words, the main result of our basic framework still holds:
higher levels of common ownership between the focal generic firm and the brand firm
reduce the likelihood of entry.
Second, as can be seen from coefficients on δ′ in columns (1), (2) and (3), the
overall impact of common ownership between the other potential generic entrant and
the brand company, δ′, is positive; i.e. higher common ownership between G′ and the
brand increases the likelihood that G enters on average. The logic is as follows: higher
common ownership between G′ and the brand reduces the likelihood of entry by G′.
This reduced likelihood of entry by G′ in turn increases the likelihood of entry by the
focal generic G. Therefore, entry decisions between generic companies G and G′ are
characterised, on average, by strategic substitutabilities. Note, however, that these
results are not very significant. This is perhaps not surprising, as we are measuring
average effects that might hide heterogeneities in terms of strategic substitutability and
complementarity.
Therefore, in a next step we include interaction effects δ×δ′ (see columns (4), (5) and
(6)). The coefficient on the interaction term δ× δ′ is negative, although not signifcant.
Thus, we find some evidence that higher levels of G′’s common ownership with brand,
reinforces the negative effect of G’s common ownership with brand.
To understand how common ownership influences entry decisions of generics to be
strategic substitutes or complements, we perform a thought experiment on δS and δ
′
S
and impose symmetry, i.e. δS = δ
′
S = x. The overall effect of G
′’s common ownership
with the brand on G’s probability of entry is positive if 0.009x− 0.02x2 > 0, which can
be re-written as x < 0.45. Hence, for symmetric common ownership levels of G and G′
with the brand company, for lower levels of common ownership (x < 0.45), G′’s common
ownership with the brand has an overall positive effect on G’s probability of entry
(entrants are strategic substitutes). For higher levels common ownership (x > 0.45),
G′’s common ownership with the brand has an overall negative effect on G’s probability
of entry. Thus, entry decisions are strategic complements.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δS -0.0124*** -0.0109**
(0.00438) (0.00475)
δ′S 0.00674 0.00913*
(0.00512) (0.00533)
δS × δ′S -0.0226
(0.0269)
δC -0.0427*** -0.0384***
(0.0131) (0.0142)
δ′C 0.0118 0.0182
(0.0148) (0.0154)
δC × δ′C -0.182
(0.194)
δL -0.0169*** -0.0159***
(0.00401) (0.00435)
δ′L 0.00910* 0.0106*
(0.00534) (0.00554)
δL × δ′L -0.0164
(0.0252)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.0412*** -0.0406*** -0.0412*** -0.0412*** -0.0406*** -0.0412***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0222*** 0.0221*** 0.0222*** 0.0221*** 0.0221*** 0.0222***
(0.00622) (0.00622) (0.00622) (0.00622) (0.00622) (0.00621)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0223*** 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0222*** 0.0223*** 0.0224***
(0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0176*** 0.0177*** 0.0175*** 0.0176*** 0.0177*** 0.0175***
(0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.00102 0.000980 0.00107 0.00103 0.000991 0.00108
(0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.00449** -0.00451** -0.00441** -0.00448** -0.00449** -0.00440**
(0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00183)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.000809 -0.000796 -0.000839 -0.000814 -0.000806 -0.000846
(0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152)
Experience Route 0.00835*** 0.00834*** 0.00836*** 0.00835*** 0.00834*** 0.00836***
(0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000565) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564)
Experience ATC2 0.0602*** 0.0602*** 0.0601*** 0.0602*** 0.0602*** 0.0601***
(0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699)
Experience New Drug 0.00437** 0.00433** 0.00478** 0.00438** 0.00434** 0.00479**
(0.00222) (0.00217) (0.00219) (0.00222) (0.00217) (0.00219)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00325*** 0.00334*** 0.00330*** 0.00325*** 0.00333*** 0.00329***
(0.000920) (0.000924) (0.000920) (0.000920) (0.000924) (0.000920)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0300*** 0.0295*** 0.0296*** 0.0300*** 0.0295*** 0.0296***
(0.00676) (0.00676) (0.00675) (0.00676) (0.00676) (0.00675)
Observations 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737
Drug markets 451 451 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry within 18 months. ∗ ∗ ∗p <
0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 6: Multiple Entrants
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8 Conclusion
Ownership linkages between firms, which typically arise due to large institutional in-
vestors that invest in multiple firms in an industry, are a defining feature of firm own-
ership structures in the present day. Consequently the question of whether institu-
tional investors influence firm strategies and correspondingly whether common own-
ership between rival firms has an effect on product markets outcomes has recently
attracted significant attention.
In this paper we consider the effect of common ownership on market entry decisions
in the pharmaceutical industry. Given that generic entry results in substantial revenue
losses for the brand firm, a simple theory model shows that with common ownership,
a potential generic entrant partly internalises the harm that entry inflicts on the in-
cumbent and thus is less likely to enter. Empirical results lend robust support to
this proposition. We show that higher common ownership between a potential generic
entrant and the brand firm (incumbent) in a specific drug market has a significant
negative effect on the likelihood that the generic firm will enter the market. Based on
a linear probability model that relates generic entry to several measures of common
ownership with the brand, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in common
ownership decreases the probability of generic entry by 9-13%.
We further consider how common ownership between other rival generics and the
brand may influence the focal generic firm’s entry decision. We theoretically show that
the classical result of entry decisions being strategic substitutes may be reversed into
being strategic substitutes in the presence of high common ownership. We find some
empirical evidence that this can indeed be the case.
This research contributes to the literature on the product markets effects of common
ownership and informs the current debate on the influence of institutional investors.
We provide evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that common shareholders
indeed influence strategic decisions of companies. Given the importance of generic
entry in terms of reducing drug prices and therefore overall healthcare costs, common
ownership in the pharmaceutical industry may have the potential to raise the costs to
consumers and healthcare payors.
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Appendix on dataset construction
This Appendix contains a detailed description of how the data used for the analysis in this paper was
constructed. The FDA Orange Book was downloaded from the FDA website in 2017q2. First duplicate
applications in the FDA Orange Book were identified and removed. Where duplicate applications had
different approval dates, the earlier date was taken. Thereafter the products in the dataset were merged
with historical patent data from the FDA based on the FDA drug application number and product
number. The patent data provides a complete list of which patents are associated with the product
and their corresponding expiration dates.
In the FDA Orange Book, a drug product (which is thus equal to the “relevant product mar-
ket ”) can be identified as a unique ingredient-form-strength combination. For example, Cetirizine
Hydrochloride in syrup form with a strength of 5mg/5ml.
Initially, the FDA Orange Book reports 3964 products at the ingredient-form-strength level that
were launched from 1982q1 until 2017q2. For our purposes we restricted the data in multiple ways.
First, we consider only drug products that faced generic entry or patent expiry in the time frame
2004q1 to 2014q4 (this is the range where we have data on all variables). This results in a sample of
1080 unique drug products. We then drop drug products which are not linked to any patent (since
this study focuses on market entry in markets that are initially protected by patents). This results
in 666 unique drug products. Thereafter we drop OTC drugs, keeping only prescription drugs. This
results in 640 unique drug products.
On the basis of information contained in the Orange Book we seek to remove product markets were
the original brand drug was withdrawn for safety reasons. We identify these markets as markets where
the original brand has been discontinued, there is no note in the Orange Book that the discontinuation
was not for safety reasons. Dropping these markets results in 554 product markets. We drop two further
product markets where generic applications (ANDAs) are approved before the NDA application for
the same ingredient-form-strength. This results in 552 product markets.
We then aggregate these product markets to the ingredient-form level. We take the first strength
that was approved by the FDA at the ingredient-form level as the relevant brand product. We then
identify subsequent ANDAs that were approved at the same ingredient-form level. In cases where a
generic enters with multiple strengths, we keep only the earliest entry. This results in 457 unique
product markets, or brand products, at the ingredient-form level.
A variable is constructed that takes the earlier of either generic entry or the date of the last
expiring patent for the relevant product market at the ingredient-form level; call this date the “end
of exclusivity ”. In line with the literature, we merge in annual drug sales data from one year before
the end of exclusivity. The sales data is obtained from drugs.com. Drugs.com provides the annual
US sales figures for the top 200 drugs for the years 2003 - 2010 (source: Verispan/ VONA) and the
top 100 drugs for the years 2011 - 2013 (source: IMS Health/Midas). Out the sample of 457 product
markets, 131 product markets at the ingredient-form level can be matched with sales data.
The sales data is matched with the FDA Orange book on the basis of trade name. Whereas in
some cases the trade name provides an indication of which dosage form the sales refer to, in most
cases we have just the trade name of the product. Hence for drugs which are offered in different forms,
the different forms are each matched with the total sales of the product. In total there are 160 drug
product markets which are available in different forms. One ingredient may be offered in as many
as 4 different forms (e.g. tablet; oral, for suspension, oral; capsule, oral; injectable, injection). If we
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chose to only keep one form per ingredient we would drop 92 product markets. Of the drugs which
are matched to sales data, there are 68 product markets where the ingredient is available in different
forms.
Each product is linked through exact text matching, based on compound-name, with the ATC/DDD
Index 2015. The ATC/DDD Index 2015 is used to identify relevant therapeutic markets and chemical
classes for different levels of the ATC classification system. Whereas the ATC-3 level is most in line
with market definition in M&A approval procedures in Europe and the United States, through the
matching process one drug may be linked with numerous therapeutic classes at the ATC-3 level. To
ensure that we obtain a unique therapeutic for each drug, we use the broader market definition of
ATC-2.
For each product market, we identify if the brand firm has launched its own generic in the market
(an “authorised generic ”) using the FDA list of authorised generics. The merge was conducted on the
basis of trade name and form. Additional information, such as submission class, is merged in using
the FDA application number. We recode the FDA form/route variable to construct five form/route
classes namely oral, injection, topical, ophthalmic and inhalation.
The current online version of the FDA Orange Book suffers from partial back-dating of company
names to reflect the current manufacturer of the drug. To correct for this we downloaded previous
versions of the Orange Book (2001q4, 2002q4,..., 2014q4) using Internet Archive. Using information
from previous versions of the Orange Book, we determine the company name of the generic company
at approval and the name of brand company at the end of exclusivity.
The data on firms and their product launches from the FDA Orange book is then matched with the
Thomson Reuters ownership dataset based on the name of the pharmaceutical company. We correct for
the fact that firms may change their name over the course of the sample period and undergo mergers,
on the basis of public information.
Based on public information we record the year-quarters in which each firm is either publicly listed
or not. For example, some companies in the sample start out being publicly listed, and then are taken
off the stock exchange (for example, if they experience a leveraged buyout) and then are later made
public again. It can occur that a company that is known to have been public in a specific year-quarter,
has no ownership information in this year-quarter in the Thomson Reuters dataset. Where we have a
public firm in the pair that has missing ownership data we remove this pair from the analysis. A total
6 product markets are dropped due to missing ownership data, resulting in 451 product markets.
Subsidiary firms are assigned the ownership structure of the parent firm under the assumption that
they are fully controlled by the parent. However in recognition of the fact that the subsidiary is a
separate entity from the parent with its own previous experience, we determine all experience variables
at the subsidiary level. That is, we do not assign the experience of the parent to the subsidiary. There
are 43 unique pairs where the relationship between the brand and potential generic entrant is that of
parent and subsidiary.
We are also able to identify cross ownership links in the data, that is, where one firm has an
ownership stake of less than 50% in another firm. There are three pairs in the dataset where the
brand has a stake-holding in the potential generic entrant for some time periods (Daiichi-Ranbaxy,
Galderma-Alcon and Novartis-Alcon). There is one pair where the potential generic entrant has a
stake-holding in the brand (Taro-Sun).
In total there are 102 unique brand companies (77 of which are publicly listed at some point in time)
and 145 unique generic companies (69 of which are publicly listed at some point in time) operating
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within the relevant markets and time period. Given that the focus of the paper is on links between
brand and generic companies, we make our dataset pairwise: brand-generic pair; there are 13,954
unique pairs.
The common ownership measures are constructed at the pair level using data from Thomson Reuters
Global Ownership Database from 2003 to 2014. We calculate common ownership measures in the year
of the end of exclusivity (lag 0), one year prior (lag 1) and two years prior (lag 2). When constructing
measures of common ownership, we restrict ourselves to the investor holdings that represent at least
one percent in the equity of the firms. Investor acquisitions during this period and ultimate owners
are identified on the basis of public sources.
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Appendix on common ownership
There is more and more evidence that institutional investors influence governance, policies and
strategic decisions of firms (e.g., Aghion et al., 2013; Brav et al., 2008; Brav et al., 2016). But this
evidence often focuses on the role of active fund managers, such as hedge funds (some evidence). The
literature proposes two channels through which large investors can affect corporate decisions: Voice
and exit. Both channels appear at first sight not suited for passive investors, who do not actively buy
or sell shares.
The voice channel, where investors actively interact with management to discuss their preferences,
looks expensive for low-cost passive institutional investors that cover literally thousands of stocks.
This argument becomes stronger when considering that passive investors are typically more diversified
and thus have less resources to spend per firm in their portfolio. The exit channel is not available to
index-tracking investors who follow often indices like the S&P 500, and who are additionally mostly
paid by minimising the tracking error with these indices. Moreover, one might argue that passive
institutional investors might lack the incentives to monitor as they seek to deliver the performance of
a benchmark, and not of an in individual firm.
But there are several reasons why the growth of passive investors might lead to a higher influence in
firms’ decisions, and not lower. First, passive investors are less willing, or are more restricted, to divest
their positions in poorly performing stocks since they follow an index. Therefore, they might be more
motivated than other institutions to be engaged owners (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998). Furthermore,
passive institutional investors insist that they have a fiduciary duty to weigh in on firms’ decisions and
do so through informal meetings with management and through voting at annual general meetings
by the employment, for example, of proxy voters such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
(Malenko and Shen, 2016). Managers might actually be more inclined to listen to passive investors,
as their stakes are sizeable and tend to exhibit lower turnover rates (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).
Indeed, anecdotal evidence in Appel et al. (2016) suggests that informal discussions between passive
institutions and managers, backed with the threat of voice (i.e., voting in shareholding meetings), are
often used to exert influence.33
Some commentators worry that passive investors lack the motives and resources to monitor their
large, diverse portfolios, and that the increasing market share of those investors weakens firm-level
performance.34 Others, however, assert that passive investors is something very different from passive
owners.35
Using an IV approach to account for correlations between passive investment and companies’
choices, Appel et al. (2016) find that passive mutual funds have a significant and positive impact
33Glenn Booraem, controller of Vanguard funds, notes that engagement with directors and manage-
ment of companies is a key component and that Vanguard has “found through hundreds of discussions
every year ” that it is “frequently able to accomplish as much -or much more through dialogue ” as
through voting (Booraem, 2014).
34A quote from the Economist (2015) on February 7, taken from Appel et al. (2016), expresses
this view: “A rising chunk of the stock market sits in the hands of lazy investors. Index funds and
exchange-traded funds mimic the market’s movements, and typically take little interest in how firms are
run; conventional mutual funds and pension funds that oversee diversified portfolios dislike becoming
deeply involved in firms’ management.”
35See, for example, an article in the Financial Times on April 6 2014, by Rakhi Kumar, head of cor-
porate governance at State Street Global (a passive institutional investor), titled “Passive investment,
active ownership.”
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on several aspects of corporate governance (board composition, anti-takover provisions and unequal
voting rights). Their evidence further suggests that a key mechanism by which passive investors exert
their influence is through their large voting blocks. Furthermore, long-term passive ownership leads to
an increase in firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q (but no change in firms’ investments).
Boone and White (2015) examine the effects of institutional ownership on firm transparency and
information production. They find that higher institutional ownership is associated with greater man-
agement disclosure; resulting in lower informational asymmetries. Interestingly, and in line with the
findings of Appel et al. (2016), they find that indexing investors have the highest influence on in-
formation production. Thus, their evidence illustrates that indexing institutions can provide positive
informational effects, which contrasts with claims that passive investors offer few benefits (Coffee,
1991).
Large institutional investors confirm that they want to influence companies’ corporate policies and
strategies. For example, Vanguard’s chairman recently stated that Vanguard seeks active interactions
with firms they invest in: “In the past, some have mistakenly assumed that our predominantly passive
management style suggests a passive attitude with respect to corporate governance. Nothing could be
further from the truth.”36 A similar message emerges from BlackRock’s chairman Larry Fink, “We are
an active voice, we work with companies, we need to work for the long-term interest.”37
Specifically in pharmaceutical markets, institutional investors can be seen to take an active interest
in the strategic decisions of companies. In 2016, a group of representatives of major US mutual funds
(Fidelity Investments, T. Rowe Price Group Inc., Wellington Management Co., among others) met up
with top biotechnology and pharmaceutical executives and lobbyists to discuss the pricing conditions
of the market and the possible steps that could be taken in order to avoid future regulations. This
example also illustrates that investor interactions need not be addressed to a particular company but
can be extended to a specific industry.38
36Letter sent by F. William McNabb III, Vanguard’s Chairman and CEO, to the independent leaders
of the boards of directors of the Vanguard funds’ largest portfolio holdings, dated 27 February 2015,
available at https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/CEO Letter 03 02 ext.pdf.
37Wall Street Journal, ‘BlackRock’s Larry Fink: typical activists are too short-term’, dated
16 January 2014, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/01/16/blackRocks-larry-fink-
typical-activists-are-too- short-term/
38Chen, C. (2016). Mutual fund industry to drug makers: stand up and defend yourself.
Bloomberg News. Retrieved from https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/05/10/mutual-fund-
industry-drugmakers-stand-and-defend-yourself/REKxLITGDeQR2oVmUZaTIP/story.html
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Appendix: IHE Index
Figure 3: iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) ETF
Figure 4: Comparison of Dow Jones Pharma Index and IHE returns
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Appendix: Top common investors by region
Southern Asia Eastern Asia Northern Europe
Life Insurance of India 12 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 7 BlackRock 6
Citigroup 7 Nomura Holdings 6 Invesco 5
La Caixa 7 Nippon Life Insurance 6 Aviva 5
fil investment management 7 Sumitomo Life Insurance 4 NBIM 5
HDFC Asset Mgmt 6 Nikko Asset Mgmt 4 HarbourVest Partners 5
Western Europe Northern America
BlackRock 10 BlackRock 65
Fidelity Investments 9 Vanguard Group 59
NBIM 8 State Street Global 57
HarbourVest Partners 6 Northern Trust Global 45
Franklin Templeton 6 Fidelity Investments 42
Table 7: Top common owners in each region for pharmaceutical firms and their number
of blockholdings >1% (2009)
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Appendix: First-Stage
(1) (2) (3)
δS δC δL
Index Periods 0.0527*** 0.0207*** 0.0652***
(0.000822) (0.000331) (0.00101)
Same Region 0.0103*** 0.00635*** 0.00614***
(0.00143) (0.000495) (0.00157)
Constant 0.0776*** 0.0197*** 0.0547***
(0.00701) (0.00218) (0.00676)
Observations 58,737 58,737 58,737
Drug markets 451 451 451
R-squared 0.285 0.298 0.293
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
F-Test 156.7 110.7 115
F-Test (p-val) 0 0 0
Weak Instrument 2289 2253 2215
Endogeneity test (p-val) 0.276 0.445 0.757
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. For simplicity only the
coefficients associated with the excluded instruments are reported. ∗ ∗ ∗p <
0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 8: First-stage IV regressions
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Appendix: Additional measures of common ownership
δM =
M∑
j=1
max(γjB ; γjG) (16)
δG =
M∑
j=1
√
γjB + γjG (17)
δH =
M∑
j=1
γjB × γjG
γjB + γjG
(18)
where j = 1, ....,M are the investors that B and G have in common. γjB is the size of the
shareholding of investor j in the brand (e.g. 5%) and γjG is the size of the shareholding of investor j
in the generic. The measure δH is a variant of the measure used by Harford et al. (2011).
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Appendix: Robustness
Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δS -0.257** -0.573**
(0.100) (0.224)
δC -0.773*** -1.879***
(0.298) (0.666)
δL -0.271*** -0.697***
(0.104) (0.230)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.948* -0.935* -0.937* -2.297** -2.258** -2.271**
(0.490) (0.489) (0.489) (1.089) (1.087) (1.087)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.328*** 0.846*** 0.848*** 0.845***
(0.0862) (0.0861) (0.0862) (0.192) (0.191) (0.191)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.331*** 0.330*** 0.332*** 0.780*** 0.778*** 0.783***
(0.0534) (0.0534) (0.0534) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.310*** 0.712*** 0.717*** 0.712***
(0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.0549 0.0551 0.0554 0.0937 0.0932 0.0937
(0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0793) (0.0792) (0.0792)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.0939** -0.0943** -0.0935** -0.187** -0.187** -0.186**
(0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0896) (0.0896) (0.0894)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.0115 -0.0102 -0.0116 -0.0370 -0.0348 -0.0380
(0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0438) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
Experience Route 0.0532*** 0.0530*** 0.0533*** 0.0977*** 0.0975*** 0.0984***
(0.00421) (0.00420) (0.00423) (0.00904) (0.00902) (0.00913)
Experience ATC2 0.419*** 0.419*** 0.419*** 0.736*** 0.737*** 0.736***
(0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0461) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Experience New Drug -0.0824** -0.0840** -0.0800** -0.212*** -0.210*** -0.198**
(0.0359) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0796) (0.0792) (0.0795)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.615*** 0.616*** 0.613***
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0358)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2.271*** -2.278*** -2.280*** -4.516*** -4.522*** -4.528***
(0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (0.563) (0.563) (0.563)
Observations 57,835 57,835 57,835 57,835 57,835 57,835
Drug Markets 451 451 451 451 451 451
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry within 18 months. The
instruments are the number of periods listed in the ETF iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) and an indicator
variable that takes on the value 1 when the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same region.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 9: Robustness - Probit and Logit Estimations of Main Specification
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Probit Logit
δS (0 < δ ≤ 0.3) 0.0498 0.0988
(0.0333) (0.0769)
δS (0.3 < δ ≤ 0.5) -0.0773 -0.135
(0.0537) (0.117)
δS (δ > 0.5) -0.174** -0.411**
(0.0843) (0.181)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.912* -2.202**
(0.490) (1.090)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.330*** 0.848***
(0.0862) (0.191)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.334*** 0.786***
(0.0534) (0.121)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.310*** 0.709***
(0.0486) (0.110)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.0587* 0.102
(0.0347) (0.0792)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.0931** -0.185**
(0.0402) (0.0895)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.0140 -0.0430
(0.0437) (0.103)
Experience Route 0.0537*** 0.0985***
(0.00425) (0.00910)
Experience ATC2 0.419*** 0.738***
(0.0460) (0.101)
Experience New Drug -0.0908** -0.228***
(0.0357) (0.0792)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.231*** 0.601***
(0.0159) (0.0370)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes
Constant -2.294*** -4.559***
(0.227) (0.565)
Observations 57,835 57,835
Drug markets 451 451
R-squared
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The depend-
ent variable is entry within 18 months. The instruments are the
number of periods listed in the ETF iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical
(IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 when
the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same
region. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 10: Robustness - Logit and Probit Estimations of Categorical Variables Specific-
ation
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OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
δS 0.0390*** 0.0382*** -0.0151*** -0.0121*** 0.0122 0.00919 -0.0695*** -0.0234**
(0.00435) (0.00434) (0.00413) (0.00437) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0116)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.00881 -0.00773 -0.0430*** -0.0411*** -0.0108 -0.00999 -0.0512*** -0.0427***
(0.00832) (0.00842) (0.00971) (0.0102) (0.00835) (0.00845) (0.00997) (0.0103)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0242*** 0.0226*** 0.0219*** 0.0252*** 0.0245*** 0.0221***
(0.00561) (0.00528) (0.00619) (0.00565) (0.00533) (0.00620)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0325*** 0.0285*** 0.0223*** 0.0327*** 0.0290*** 0.0225***
(0.00347) (0.00329) (0.00364) (0.00348) (0.00330) (0.00366)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0221*** 0.0208*** 0.0177*** 0.0224*** 0.0214*** 0.0178***
(0.00312) (0.00298) (0.00308) (0.00312) (0.00299) (0.00308)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.00243* 0.00132 0.000922 0.00223 0.000981 0.000870
(0.00141) (0.00136) (0.00152) (0.00142) (0.00136) (0.00151)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.000103 -0.000281 -0.00445** -0.000128 -0.000276 -0.00454**
(0.000392) (0.000384) (0.00183) (0.000392) (0.000385) (0.00184)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.000821 -0.00375*** -0.000814 -0.000608 -0.00350*** -0.000762
(0.000525) (0.000521) (0.00152) (0.000521) (0.000518) (0.00152)
Experience Route 0.00764*** 0.00835*** 0.00765*** 0.00835***
(0.000535) (0.000564) (0.000535) (0.000564)
Experience ATC2 0.0678*** 0.0602*** 0.0667*** 0.0601***
(0.00696) (0.00699) (0.00698) (0.00699)
Experience New Drug 0.00303 0.00434* 0.00849*** 0.00549**
(0.00216) (0.00222) (0.00233) (0.00233)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00258*** 0.00325*** 0.00364*** 0.00343***
(0.000874) (0.000920) (0.000924) (0.000946)
Therapeutic field (0/1) No No No Yes No No No Yes
Drug form (0/1) No No No Yes No No No Yes
Submission type (0/1) No No No Yes No No No Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) No No No Yes No No No Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) No No No Yes No No No Yes
Constant 0.0171*** 0.0139*** 0.00548*** 0.0296*** 0.0191*** 0.0157*** 0.00698*** 0.0299***
(0.000587) (0.00104) (0.00102) (0.00674) (0.000982) (0.00129) (0.00110) (0.00676)
Observations 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737
Drug markets 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.002 0.007 0.069 0.079 0.001 0.006 0.066 0.079
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry within 18 months. The instruments are the number of periods listed
in the ETF iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 when the main headquarters of both companies
are located in the same region. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 11: Robustness - Stepwise OLS and IV (δS)
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OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δM -0.0187*** -0.0315*
(0.00628) (0.0161)
δG -0.0326*** -0.0465**
(0.00995) (0.0229)
δH -0.0699*** -0.101**
(0.0216) (0.0490)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.0408*** -0.0408*** -0.0407*** -0.0417*** -0.0414*** -0.0413***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0218*** 0.0219*** 0.0219*** 0.0219*** 0.0220*** 0.0220***
(0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00620) (0.00620) (0.00620)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0223***
(0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0177*** 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 0.0179***
(0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.000916 0.000922 0.000927 0.000874 0.000899 0.000904
(0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.00450** -0.00450** -0.00449** -0.00460** -0.00456** -0.00455**
(0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00184)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.000762 -0.000770 -0.000780 -0.000688 -0.000728 -0.000741
(0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00151) (0.00152) (0.00152)
Experience Route 0.00834*** 0.00834*** 0.00834*** 0.00833*** 0.00834*** 0.00834***
(0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564)
Experience ATC2 0.0602*** 0.0602*** 0.0602*** 0.0601*** 0.0601*** 0.0601***
(0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699)
Experience New Drug 0.00426* 0.00439** 0.00435** 0.00505** 0.00494** 0.00490**
(0.00220) (0.00219) (0.00218) (0.00225) (0.00222) (0.00222)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00331*** 0.00335*** 0.00334*** 0.00348*** 0.00347*** 0.00347***
(0.000923) (0.000924) (0.000924) (0.000954) (0.000951) (0.000949)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0295*** 0.0294*** 0.0293*** 0.0297*** 0.0294*** 0.0293***
(0.00674) (0.00674) (0.00674) (0.00675) (0.00674) (0.00673)
Observations 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737 58,737
Drug Markets 451 451 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry within 18 months. The instruments are
the number of periods listed in the ETF iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the
value 1 when the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same region. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 12: Robustness - Additional measures of common ownership
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OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δS -0.0242*** -0.0183
(0.00657) (0.0167)
δC -0.0723*** -0.0470
(0.0186) (0.0416)
δL -0.0261*** -0.0141
(0.00558) (0.0135)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.0722*** -0.0707*** -0.0714*** -0.0713*** -0.0700*** -0.0700***
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0164)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0295*** 0.0294*** 0.0293*** 0.0293*** 0.0292*** 0.0291***
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0316*** 0.0315*** 0.0317*** 0.0315*** 0.0314*** 0.0315***
(0.00554) (0.00553) (0.00554) (0.00556) (0.00554) (0.00555)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0261*** 0.0262*** 0.0260*** 0.0260*** 0.0261*** 0.0259***
(0.00509) (0.00509) (0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00508)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.00193 0.00198 0.00196 0.00195 0.00199 0.00198
(0.00266) (0.00266) (0.00266) (0.00265) (0.00265) (0.00265)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.00781** -0.00783** -0.00773** -0.00776** -0.00775** -0.00768**
(0.00354) (0.00354) (0.00354) (0.00354) (0.00354) (0.00354)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.00340 -0.00336 -0.00341 -0.00344 -0.00342 -0.00347
(0.00324) (0.00324) (0.00324) (0.00323) (0.00323) (0.00323)
Experience Route 0.00822*** 0.00821*** 0.00825*** 0.00822*** 0.00822*** 0.00824***
(0.000672) (0.000672) (0.000673) (0.000672) (0.000672) (0.000672)
Experience ATC2 0.0632*** 0.0632*** 0.0632*** 0.0633*** 0.0633*** 0.0633***
(0.00831) (0.00832) (0.00831) (0.00831) (0.00831) (0.00830)
Experience New Drug 0.00389 0.00354 0.00416 0.00328 0.00279 0.00290
(0.00293) (0.00287) (0.00290) (0.00314) (0.00296) (0.00302)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00315** 0.00325** 0.00309* 0.00305* 0.00307* 0.00293*
(0.00158) (0.00159) (0.00158) (0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00159)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0840*** 0.0826*** 0.0827*** 0.0838*** 0.0829*** 0.0830***
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Observations 31,979 31,979 31,979 31,979 31,979 31,979
Drug Markets 451 451 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry within 18 months. The instruments are
the number of periods listed in the ETF iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the
value 1 when the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same region. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 13: Robustness - Entrants with experience in drug form
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OLS IV Probit Logit
δS (0 < δ ≤ 0.3) -0.000349 -0.00678 -0.0298 -0.0724
(0.00280) (0.00469) (0.0366) (0.0786)
δS (0.3 < δ ≤ 0.5) -0.00757* -0.00803 -0.127** -0.245**
(0.00407) (0.00535) (0.0555) (0.116)
δS (δ > 0.5) -0.0149*** -0.0146** -0.208** -0.488***
(0.00490) (0.00646) (0.0872) (0.179)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.0708*** -0.0731*** -0.967** -2.348**
(0.0164) (0.0166) (0.489) (1.088)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0294*** 0.0294*** 0.333*** 0.805***
(0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0944) (0.195)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0316*** 0.0315*** 0.346*** 0.776***
(0.00554) (0.00553) (0.0566) (0.122)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0260*** 0.0262*** 0.309*** 0.668***
(0.00508) (0.00508) (0.0536) (0.114)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.00206 0.00190 0.0416 0.0700
(0.00265) (0.00265) (0.0378) (0.0817)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.00773** -0.00785** -0.0934** -0.173*
(0.00355) (0.00354) (0.0456) (0.0956)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.00349 -0.00342 -0.0257 -0.0614
(0.00324) (0.00323) (0.0507) (0.109)
Experience Route 0.00825*** 0.00822*** 0.0643*** 0.126***
(0.000673) (0.000672) (0.00491) (0.0101)
Experience ATC2 0.0633*** 0.0632*** 0.355*** 0.600***
(0.00832) (0.00831) (0.0489) (0.100)
Experience New Drug 0.00324 0.00400 -0.107*** -0.226***
(0.00295) (0.00300) (0.0353) (0.0748)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00292* 0.00330** 0.162*** 0.404***
(0.00160) (0.00163) (0.0195) (0.0428)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0834*** 0.0851*** -1.445*** -2.561***
(0.0151) (0.0152) (0.270) (0.626)
Observations 31,979 31,979 31,406 31,406
Drug markets 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.086 0.086
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry
within 18 months. The instruments are the number of periods listed in the ETF
iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the value 1
when the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same region. ∗∗∗p <
0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 14: Robustness - Entrants with experience in drug form
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Lag = 2 Lag = 1 Lag = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
δS -0.0127** -0.0121*** -0.0127***
(0.00501) (0.00437) (0.00404)
δC -0.0466*** -0.0422*** -0.0423***
(0.0144) (0.0130) (0.0121)
δL -0.0169*** -0.0166*** -0.0170***
(0.00469) (0.00400) (0.00369)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.0413*** -0.0410*** -0.0412*** -0.0411*** -0.0406*** -0.0411*** -0.0450*** -0.0443*** -0.0448***
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00896) (0.00893) (0.00894)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0246*** 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 0.0219*** 0.0219*** 0.0218*** 0.0214*** 0.0215*** 0.0214***
(0.00685) (0.00685) (0.00685) (0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00611) (0.00611) (0.00610)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0229*** 0.0229*** 0.0229*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0224*** 0.0220*** 0.0220*** 0.0221***
(0.00371) (0.00371) (0.00371) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00360) (0.00359) (0.00359)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 0.0177*** 0.0178*** 0.0177*** 0.0174*** 0.0175*** 0.0174***
(0.00324) (0.00324) (0.00324) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00304) (0.00304) (0.00304)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.000957 0.000936 0.000947 0.000922 0.000928 0.000930 0.000863 0.000838 0.000858
(0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00150)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.00394** -0.00397** -0.00391** -0.00445** -0.00448** -0.00444** -0.00427** -0.00427** -0.00429**
(0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00180)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.00177 -0.00177 -0.00179 -0.000814 -0.000788 -0.000827 -0.000827 -0.000786 -0.000839
(0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00150)
Experience Route 0.00812*** 0.00812*** 0.00813*** 0.00835*** 0.00834*** 0.00836*** 0.00830*** 0.00830*** 0.00832***
(0.000570) (0.000570) (0.000570) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000565)
Experience ATC2 0.0593*** 0.0592*** 0.0591*** 0.0602*** 0.0602*** 0.0601*** 0.0604*** 0.0604*** 0.0603***
(0.00702) (0.00702) (0.00702) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00700) (0.00700) (0.00699)
Experience New Drug 0.00553** 0.00564** 0.00587*** 0.00434* 0.00431** 0.00475** 0.00425* 0.00415* 0.00466**
(0.00225) (0.00221) (0.00223) (0.00222) (0.00217) (0.00219) (0.00221) (0.00217) (0.00219)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00235** 0.00244*** 0.00239** 0.00325*** 0.00333*** 0.00329*** 0.00336*** 0.00345*** 0.00340***
(0.000936) (0.000938) (0.000935) (0.000920) (0.000924) (0.000920) (0.000920) (0.000923) (0.000920)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0214*** 0.0211*** 0.0210*** 0.0296*** 0.00333*** 0.0292*** 0.0287*** 0.0282*** 0.0283***
(0.00736) (0.00736) (0.00735) (0.00674) (0.000924) (0.00674) (0.00665) (0.00664) (0.00664)
Observations 54,035 54,035 54,035 58,737 58,737 58,737 59,390 59,390 59,390
Drug Markets 415 415 415 451 451 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.080
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry within 18 months. The instruments are the number of periods listed in the ETF
iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 when the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same region.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 15: Robustness - Common ownership measured 2, 1 and 0 years before end of
exclusivity (OLS)
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Lag = 2 Lag = 1 Lag = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
δS -0.0393*** -0.0234** -0.0164
(0.0140) (0.0116) (0.0104)
δC -0.0972*** -0.0601** -0.0436*
(0.0341) (0.0291) (0.0264)
δL -0.0327*** -0.0187** -0.0132
(0.0118) (0.00952) (0.00863)
Subsidiary (0/1) -0.0447*** -0.0425*** -0.0426*** -0.0427*** -0.0412*** -0.0413*** -0.0456*** -0.0444*** -0.0444***
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00906) (0.00894) (0.00895)
Sales Rank (1-10) (0/1) 0.0248*** 0.0249*** 0.0248*** 0.0221*** 0.0220*** 0.0218*** 0.0215*** 0.0215*** 0.0214***
(0.00685) (0.00685) (0.00685) (0.00620) (0.00620) (0.00619) (0.00612) (0.00611) (0.00611)
Sales Rank (11-50) (0/1) 0.0232*** 0.0230*** 0.0231*** 0.0225*** 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 0.0221*** 0.0220*** 0.0220***
(0.00373) (0.00372) (0.00372) (0.00366) (0.00365) (0.00365) (0.00361) (0.00360) (0.00360)
Sales Rank (51-100) (0/1) 0.0154*** 0.0155*** 0.0153*** 0.0178*** 0.0179*** 0.0177*** 0.0174*** 0.0175*** 0.0174***
(0.00324) (0.00324) (0.00324) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00303) (0.00303) (0.00303)
Authorized Generic (0/1) 0.000851 0.000857 0.000890 0.000870 0.000907 0.000924 0.000849 0.000836 0.000870
(0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00150)
Substitutes on Patent (ATC2) -0.00415** -0.00412** -0.00398** -0.00454** -0.00453** -0.00445** -0.00429** -0.00428** -0.00427**
(0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00184) (0.00183) (0.00183) (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00181)
Substitutes off Patent (ATC2) -0.00194 -0.00186 -0.00189 -0.000762 -0.000753 -0.000821 -0.000808 -0.000783 -0.000852
(0.00176) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00150)
Experience Route 0.00813*** 0.00811*** 0.00814*** 0.00835*** 0.00834*** 0.00836*** 0.00830*** 0.00830*** 0.00832***
(0.000569) (0.000569) (0.000569) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564) (0.000564)
Experience ATC2 0.0591*** 0.0590*** 0.0589*** 0.0601*** 0.0601*** 0.0601*** 0.0604*** 0.0604*** 0.0604***
(0.00702) (0.00702) (0.00702) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00699) (0.00700) (0.00700) (0.00700)
Experience New Drug 0.00809*** 0.00709*** 0.00734*** 0.00549** 0.00483** 0.00496** 0.00463** 0.00418* 0.00427*
(0.00244) (0.00229) (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00221) (0.00224) (0.00227) (0.00218) (0.00220)
Breadth (ATC2) 0.00273*** 0.00274*** 0.00259*** 0.00343*** 0.00345*** 0.00332*** 0.00343*** 0.00346*** 0.00335***
(0.000963) (0.000963) (0.000953) (0.000946) (0.000947) (0.000935) (0.000943) (0.000945) (0.000933)
Therapeutic field (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug form (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Submission type (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generic region of origin (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year end of exclusivity (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0223*** 0.0213*** 0.0210*** 0.0299*** 0.00345*** 0.0292*** 0.0287*** 0.0282*** 0.0283***
(0.00739) (0.00736) (0.00735) (0.00676) (0.000947) (0.00673) (0.00665) (0.00663) (0.00663)
Observations 54,035 54,035 54,035 58,737 58,737 58,737 59,390 59,390 59,390
Drug Markets 415 415 415 451 451 451 451 451 451
R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.080
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is entry within 18 months. The instruments are the number of periods listed in the ETF
iShares U.S. Pharmaceutical (IHE) and an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 when the main headquarters of both companies are located in the same region.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 16: Robustness - Common ownership measured 2, 1 and 0 years before end of
exclusivity (IV)
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